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Abstract 
This study questions the level of influence that different Latin American Presidents have 
on the making of laws. In order to delimit this analysis, it is necessary to understand the 
factors that affect decision-making in Latin American parliaments. Many of the theoretical 
approaches that tackle the study of decision-making within legislative bodies maintain that 
the products – in the shape of laws – that arise from this decisional process, besides 
depending on the institutional organization of the parliament itself, depend on the political 
actors taking part, on their strategies when adapting to this institutional framework, and on 
their interests as well as on their collective and individual preferences. 
The aim of this research is to verify the explanatory strength of these theories in Latin 
American countries. Thus, an analysis is made of the importance that the institutional 
factors – relating to regulatory design- and the party factors –relating to both the presence 
of the political parties in the parliament and government and the ideological attitudes 
shown by the legislators- have in the legislative performance of diverse Latin American 




Studies focusing on legislative activity in Latin America, and more specifically on the 
importance of the role played by the President in this activity, have mainly been case 
analyses, with the two largest countries, Mexico and Brazil, being the center of attention of 
most of the researchers.1 From these studies it can be gathered that, when explaining 
legislative activity, the different researchers resort to both institutional and political factors. 
However, since there is a lack of other cases for comparison, they cannot conclude what 
the influence of the presidents and parliaments on the legislative activity is due to in 
comparative terms; they can only reach conclusions that relate a country’s legislative 
activity over time and see the effect of the political and institutional changes that have 
occurred during that time period.   
Comparative studies focusing on legislative activity are quite scarce and recent. Among 
these, mention must be made of the article by Saiegh (2004), which analyses the passage 
rates achieved by 35 Executives, among which are eight Latin American countries,2 and 
                                                 
1 One of the main reasons for the low number of studies is the difficulty in gaining access to the data on law-
making of many of the Latin American Congresses. In the case of Mexico  see Casar (2002), Hurtado (2002), 
Ugalde (2003), Alarcón and Jiménez (2003), Nava and Yañez (2003), Weldon (2004) or Jiménez (2004); for 
Brazil, Cheibub  Limongi (2000), Ricci (2002); Samuels (2002) or Amorin and Santos (2003); for Argentina 
Molinelli et al (1999), Mustapic (2002), Calvo (2004) or Calvo and Alemán (2006); for Chile, Siavelis (2002); 
for Honduras, Taylor and Díaz (1999); for Nicaragua, Navarro (2004); for the countries in Central America, 
Ajenjo (2005); for Ecuador, Mejía (2000); for Uruguay, Lanzaro et al (2000); for Paraguay, Molinas et al (2004) 
and for Venezuela, Amorin and Malgar (2000). 
2 Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Chile, Honduras, Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
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concludes that the presidents of parliamentary systems have higher rates of success than 
those of presidential systems and that this decreases when the Executive is formed by a 
coalition government.  
After analyzing these same data and focusing again on the form of government, Cheibub et 
al (2004: 578) state that legislative paralysis is very rare, even in presidential countries with 
minority governments. For these authors, the rate of presidential success falls when party 
positions on politics are polarized and political change has to be negotiated through 
promises and when government coalitions are internally divided as to their preferences. 
Another comparative study is the one carried out by Alcántara et al (2005) which analyzes 
the legislative activity of 12 Latin American countries. Although the objective of this work 
is not to reflect on the factors affecting such activity, empirical progress is made by 
showing, comparatively, the differences existing among the different countries and by 
disproving the statement that the role of Latin American parliaments is really marginal in all 
cases. A recent comparative study is the one by García (2007a and 2007b), who defends the 
importance of institutional factors in the influence of presidents and parliaments on 
legislation.     
The aim of this study is to contribute to the few studies that have legislative activity in 
Latin America as their subject. Specifically, we seek factors that determine the degree of 
legislative success of different presidents in 14 countries in the area. Hence, an in-depth 
study is carried out of the contributions made by the different theories and methodologies 
that analyze the effects of institutional arrangements in legislative policy and at the same 
time their validity is compared using the data on law-making. 
In the first part, the presidential legislative success indicator is defined; this indicator 
reports the variability of the Executive’s passage rates in the different countries analyzed. 
Next, different factors that may have an effect on this are delimited and stated: the 
institutions, the political parties and the electoral cycle. In relation to the institutions, we 
decided to use of the index of legislative institutional power (IPIL) (García, 2007a) which 
reflects the legislative institutional capacity of the parliament and Executive to intervene in 
legislative activity.  
As regards the political parties, the weight of six variables is contrasted. Three of them 
refer to their presence in the parliament and in the Executive (legislative majorities, party 
fragmentation and forming of coalitions) and the other three focus on the ideological 
attitudes and positions shown by the same (polarization and ideological coherence and 
attitudinal discipline). The sources from which the indicators for measuring the set of the 
first three were extracted are the electoral results, whereas the attitudinal variables were 
made operative from the data extracted from the research project directed by Manuel 
Alcántara “Elites Parlamentarias Latinoamericanas” (PELA) (Ref. SEC94/0284; 
SEC95/0845 and SEC02/3484).3 The last variable whose explanatory power is tested is the 
electoral cycle.  
                                                 
3 This research project, directed by Manuel Alcántara, has been carried out in the lower Chambers of Latin 
American countries since 1994; its objective is to collect the values and attitudes of Latin American  Members 
of Congress by means of a questionnaire applied to a representative sample of the members of Congress of 
the different countries in the region.  For further information on this research see García and Mateos (2006) 
and Alcántara (2006). 
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1.The legislative success of the Executive and the units of analysis.  
This study inquires into the factors affecting the different rates of legislative passage of 
proposals by Latin American presidents. The indicator used, based on Alcántara et al. 
(2005),4  for measuring these different rates is “legislative success” which refers to the 
relationship between the number of initiatives presented by the Executive and those finally 
passed (et al. 2005: 99). The units of analysis are the annual sessions or two-year legislative 
periods, except in the cases of Venezuela and Paraguay, where the unit of analysis is the 
whole presidential period of office and Mexico, where it coincides with the term of office 
(three years). In all, 103 periods of sessions pertaining to twelve Latin American countries 
are analyzed5 coinciding with 40 different presidential terms of office.6   
Figure 1 shows the values the aggregated legislative success indicator takes per presidential 
term of office and per period analyzed in each country. First it can be affirmed that, indeed, 
in the countries analyzed, the presidents have different rates of legislative success. If we 
focus on the entire analysis period in each country, the Mexican case clearly stands out, in 
which the Executive achieved the passage of 95.4% of the laws initiated in 1982-2003. 
                                                 
4 It relates the number of initiatives that the Executive  presents in a session to the number of initiatives from 
the actors themselves which are passed.  The empirical data in this study were collected within the framework 
of the research project directed by Manuel Alcántara, “El Parlamento en América Latina. Rendimiento del 
Poder Legislativo: Una clave interpretativa de los problemas de gobernabilidad de la región” financed by the 
Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional (FEDER) in the framework of the Spanish program for Research 
and Development (Ref. 1FD97-0906). Hence, most were obtained from primary sources, except those for 
Paraguay, taken from the study by Molinas et al. (2004), the data on Honduras prior to 1997, from the study 
by Taylor and Díaz (1999) and the data for Venezuela, from Amorin and Malgar (2000). 
5 Unfortunately it was not possible to include 18 countries in the Latin American cases, as was our intention, 
owing to the difficulty in gaining access to the data on legislative activity in Latin American countries. 
However, having information on twelve is considered to be sufficient for performing the analysis the study 
proposes, since the cases analyzed are sufficiently representative of the regional situation. The Latin American 
countries not analyzed in the research are: Brazil, El Salvador, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic. 
6 It is not our purpose here to make an in-depth study of each of the countries and verify the type of 
legislation the Executive Power initiates (its level of aggregation, its effect or its subject matter)  but rather to 
concentrate on the President’s “success” rates.  Hence, the laws will not be classified. Evidently, the subject 
matter of a law affects its probability of being passed. For some authors (Adler and Wikerson 2005), rather 
than showing the success of an actor in the passing of his/her proposals, an attempt should be made to show 
the common qualities of the laws passed and explain why these qualities are associated with  the degree of 
“success”. We are, therefore, aware that by not classifying them, the “success” indicator becomes related to 
laws of unequal importance.  
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The data indicate that, despite the fact that Mexico is an extreme case, there are another six 
countries of the twelve analyzed (Paraguay, Honduras, Panama, Chile, Peru and Bolivia) 
where the success rate of the Executive is between 70% and 80%.  Moreover, except for 
Ecuador, where during 1995-2002 the Executive scarcely managed to carry through 38.9% 
of its proposals, in none of the countries did the government have legislative success below 
50%. However, if success in the passing of the projects of the Latin American presidents is 
compared with those of European countries, characterized by parliamentary systems, it is 
confirmed that these rates are relatively low, since in Europe what Olson (1994:85) calls the 
90% rule occurs. That is, approximately 90% of the projects of the Executive are passed7 
(Alcántara et al, 2005).   
If attention is focused on the periods of government, Mexico is again clearly outstanding, 
since all its presidents, during the period analyzed (1892-2003) have had success rates above 
95%, although a slight decrease is observed from 1997 on, when the PRI no longer 
controlled the majority of the seats in Congress. Also outstanding is the presidency of 
Andrés Rodríguez in Paraguay (1989-1993) with a success rate of 96.2%. With lower success 
levels, other presidents who achieved percentages above 80% in the passing of laws they 
introduced were, in this order, Jaime Lusinchi and Rómulo Betancourt in Venezuela, Rafael 
Callejas in Honduras, Eduardo Frei in Chile and J. Carlos Wasmosy in Paraguay. On the 
other hand, presidents with success rates below 50% were all the presidents of Ecuador from 
1995 to 2002 (Sixto Durán Ballén, Abdalá Bucarám, Fabián Alarcón and Jamil Mahuad) 
and the Costa Rican president Abel Pacheco (2002-2004). Other Latin American 
Executives with success rates below 60% were all the Argentinean presidents analyzed in this 
research study, except Raúl Alfonsín, and the Venezuelan presidents Raúl Leoni, Rafael 
Caldera and Luis H. Campins. 
2. The institutions: the index of legislative institutional power (IPIL) 
As has been mentioned, when the importance of the presidents in legislative activity is 
explored, in Latin American cases it is common to attribute the institutional authorities of 
the Executive with a fundamental role. The regulatory design reduces transaction costs 
either by facilitating exchange, promoting specialization, or by facilitating party discipline 
and the power of the majority parties in the Congress. Hence, it is undeniable that the 
institutions are of importance. The formal powers of the actors involved in the legislative 
procedure that mark the potential control of the legislative agenda are determined by at 
least two types of norms: the Constitution and the rules of order of the Chambers.  
The central importance of the Constitution in the structuring of the decision-making 
process and in the formulation of policies is obvious, since in it the stages through which 
an initiative must pass to become law are defined, the bodies that will participate in the 
process are determined and the authority of the actors that participate is conferred and 
delimited. The internal rules regulate and organize in detail each of the stages defined by 
the Constitution and, although they must always be subject to what is stipulated by the 
Constitution, they also confer potential degrees of influence, especially for the members of 
the Legislative Power. This is of great importance since political change or stagnation, 
whether the status quo is maintained or modified, depends on the interaction maintained 
between the latter and the Executive Power.  
                                                 
7 For example in Western Germany in the period 1949-87 the percentage of government proposals passed 
was 84%; in Great Britain from 1950 to 1970 it was 95%; in Spain from 1982 to 2004, 88.3% and in Belgium 
between 1968 and 1996, 74.8%. 
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One of the ways of delimiting the importance that both powers have in the legislation is to 
analyze the legislative process as a way of isolating the institutional effects and the political 
effects. Thus, the ability that the institutions grant to the president and the legislature to 
exercise influence on the legislative agenda can be traced from the systematic analysis of 
these two basic norms, and some suppositions on the meaning of their intervention in the 
legislative activity expounded  
In this research, in order to contrast the importance that the institutional design has in 
presidential legislative success, the index of legislative institutional power (IPIL) prepared 
by García (2007a) is used. To prepare this index the author took 15 institutional indicators 
delimited by the legislative procedure. This procedure has three stages (initiating, 
constitutive, and effectiveness) and in each one a series of institutional factors act which 
allows the Executive or the Legislative Power to accelerate or ensure that their initiative is 
undertaken (positive or proactive agenda power) or allows them to delay or veto the entry 
of a project or its passing (negative or reactive agenda power) (Cox, 2006). Specifically, she 
uses 10 constitutional indicators which are summarized in Table 1.  
Table 1: Institutional indicators of agenda power in the legislative procedure stipulated in the Constitution and the 
internal regulations 
Ordinary legislative procedure 
Initiating stage Constitutive stage Effectiveness stage 
Extraordinary 
legislative procedure 
-Exclusive initiative (PAP) 
(Constitution) 
-Setting up of the agenda or 
discussion schedule (PAP) 
(Regulations) 
-Type of majority for changing the 
agenda (PAP) (Regulations) 
-Ability of the presidents to force the 
emergency process (PAP) 
(Constitution) 
-Number of Chambers (Constitution) 
-Incorporation of the committees 
(Regulations) 
-Prerogatives to prevent the law being 
processed in committees (Regulations) 
-Power of the committees to process 
bills (Regulations) 
-Total veto and override  
(NAP) (Constitution) 
-Partial veto and override 
(NAP) (Constitution) 





 BICAMERALISM   
 -Symmetry (Constitution) 
-Solving of disagreements between 
Chambers (PAP or NAP) (Constitution) 
a. Total rejection 
b. Amendments 
  
(PAP) Indicator of positive agenda power. 
(NAP) Indicator of negative agenda power. 
Source: García (2007a) 
 
The other five indicators were extracted from the internal regulations of the chambers8 and 
their inclusion is based on the supposition that the ability to make a law be taken into 
account and voted is fundamental, as is the faculty to block a bill or delay it. A considerable 
part of the different rules, procedures and structure of the Congresses deals with settling 
                                                 
8 One of the scarcest resources in the Congress is time, since the plenary session has to attend to many tasks 
among which is the legislative one and, when it attends to this function, it faces a large number of proposals. 
This means that time control by the different authorities participating in the formulation of laws appears as a 
factor determining agenda power in the parliament, gaining special importance in the initiating stage, when 
what will be discussed is decided. 
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what will be addressed in the plenary, as determined in the “agenda” (Oleszek, 2004; Cox 
and McCubbins, 1993 y 2004; McCubbins, et al, 2005).  
Therefore, the institutional mechanisms followed in order to determine the discussion 
schedule, together with the degree of consensus or concentration required for decision-
making, as well as the power of the committees in the Chambers, are the basic elements 
that define both what is to be addressed in the plenary and the number and identity of the 
actors to participate in the legislative activity. The 5 indicators used for preparing the IPIL 
can be seen in Table 1 and, the same as in the case of constitutional legislative powers, they 
have been grouped taking into consideration the stage of the legislative procedure in which 
they can take part.9 The value the countries analyzed in this study take in the index10 as well 
as the different stages are given in Table B of the appendix.  
There are differences between the values shown by the IPIL and those of other indexes 
that measure legislative power (Shugart and Carey,1992: 155; Shugart and Haggard, 2001: 
80; Samuels and Shugart, 2003: 43; Payne et al. 2003:216; PNUD, 2005:76 and Stein et al., 
2005: 49). Table 2 and Figure 2 show the different values given by the different indexes 
prepared for each of the Latin American countries and the year of the Constitution taken 
as reference. The first matter worthy of mention is the great heterogeneity among them. 
Not only is the value they adopt different, which is normal, since they respond to the 
measurement scale used, but also the presidential legislative powers in the same country are 
dissimilar depending on one index or another. This stems mainly from the indicators used 
for its preparation. In order to solve the inequality of the indexes and make them more 
comparable, the values have been transformed so that the scale varies from 0 to1 instead of 
having its original range. A further problem concerning these measurements is that not all 
the dimensions or indicators have the same impact on the legislative power of the 
president, which may lead to errors if not considered. Of the indexes given, only that of 
Stein et al. (2005) evaluates the weight of each indicator.  
                                                 
9 The hypotheses behind the including of each institutional indicator are given in Table A in the appendix. 
10 Detailed information on the construction of the index and the values taken by the countries in each 
indicator can be seen in García (2007) 
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Argentina 1853 2 0.10   2 0.33     0.44 0.49 
Argentina 1853 
(ref.1994) 
  6 0.75 5 0.63 7 0.28 28.5 0.65 0.23 0.31 
Bolivia 1967 
(ref.1994) 
2 0.10 2 0.25 2 0.33 5 0.20 15 0.34  0.41 
Brazil 1969 7 0.29         0.62  
Brazil 1988 9 0.37 3 0.37 3 0.50 11 0.44 19 0.43   
Chile 1891 8 0.33           
Chile 1925 8 0.33           
Chile 1969 12 0.50         0.66  
Chile 1989 5 0.31 4 0.50 4 0.67 12 0.48 34 0.77  0.70 
Colombia 1886 
(ref.1968) 
8 0.33   6 1     0.59  
Colombia 1991 5 0.31 4 0.50 4 0.67 11 0.44 20 0.45 0.23 0.51 
Costa Rica 1949 1 0.04 1 0.12 1 0.17 2.5 0.10 17 0.45  0.33 
Ecuador 1979 6 0.25   2 0.33     0.59 0.59 
Ecuador 1998   3  4 0.67 14.5 0.58 33 0.75 0.33 0.58 
El Salvador 1982 3 0.12 2 0.25 2 0.33 6.5 0.26 20 0.45 0.29  
Guatemala 1985 4 0.17 2 0.25 2 0.33 6.5 0.26 14 0.32 0.26 0.36 
Honduras 1982 2 0.10 1 0.12 1 0.17 2.5 0.10 14 0.32 0.24 0.39 
Mexico 1917 5 0.31 1 0.12 1 0.17 2.5 0.10 15.5 0.35 0.19 0.31 
Nicaragua 1987 3 0.12 0 0.00 0 0.00 8 0.32 12 0.27 0.43  
Panama 1972 5 0.31   2 0.33 10.5 0.42 27.5 0.62 0.19 0.63 
Paraguay 1992 6 0.25 0 0.00 0 0.00 3 0.12 13 0.27  0.61 
Peru 1979 0 0.00   1 0.17     0.50  
Peru 1993   4 0.50   13 0.48 16 0.36 0.27 0.45 
Dominican Republic 
1994 
2 0.10 2 0.25 2 0.33 8 0.32 31 0.70 0.38  
Uruguay 1967 6 0.25 2 0.25 2 0.33 6.5 0.26 22.5 0.51  0.44 
Venezuela 1961 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00     0.30 0.51 
Venezuela 2000     1 0.17 7 0.28 11 0.25   
Source: own from Shugart and Carey (1992: 155); Shugart and Haggard (2001: 80); Samuels and Shugart (2003: 43); Payne et al. 
(2003:216), PNUD (2005:76), Stein et al. (2005: 49) and García (2007). 
*The transforming of the value of the index to a scale of 0 to 1 was carried out as follows:  
Value (0-1)={value/upper value of the range of the scale} the coefficients are not weighted except for the index of Stein et al (2005). 
The countries where greater differences are observed, depending on the measurement 
considered, are the Dominican Republic, Argentina and Chile. The Shugart and Carey 
index (1992) tended to be low in comparison with the others. Hence, most of the cases are 
far removed from the maximum value that this can adopt, 0.50 and 0.3711 being the highest 
values.  Thus, it is considered that the Dominican Constitution only gives the president 
power of veto which, although a majority of two thirds is required to override it (see 
appendix) is not considered to be one of the strongest. Nevertheless, for Haggard and 
Shugart (2001) and Samuels and Shugart (2001) this ability to veto obtains the maximum 
                                                 
11 0.50 corresponds to the presidential legislative powers contemplated in the 1969 Chilean Constitution and 
0.27 to the 1988 Brazilian Constitution currently in force. 
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value, which, added to the fact that only three indicators are taken into account, makes the 
index of presidential legislative powers rise. But the maximum value for this country is that 
given by the PNUD (0.70), once again because the power of veto is considered to be 
strong and because of the existence of certain prerogatives concerning the budget, which 
favor the president. These elements, together with the fact that the index shown is not 
weighted by indicators, make the value presented high.   























































































































































































































































Shugart y Carey (1992) Shugart y Haggard (2001) Samuels y Shugart (2003)
Payne et al (2003) PNUD (2005) Stein et al. (2005)
IPIL
 
Source: own from Table 1. 
In the case of Argentina the different measurements vary from 0.28, which is the value 
given by Payne et al (2003) to 0.75, given by Shugart and Haggard (2001). Payne et al (2003) 
found that the president of Argentina has no major legislative powers, except for the right 
to veto (total and partial) which these authors fix as of intermediate degree (override 
requires the majority of two thirds of the members present), a certain ability of decree, 
subject, however, to the delegation of the Legislative power and the call for a referendum, 
the results of which are not binding. Nevertheless, Shugart and Haggard (2991) and 
Samuels and Shugart (2003) give the Argentinean president’s ability to veto and decree the 
maximum value, whereas the PNUD (2005) and Stein et al. (2005), although considering 
the ability to veto strong, situate that of decree as weak, hence the index takes intermediate 
values.  
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As regards Chile, the different measurements give the president power over the legislation 
that varies from 0.31, offered by Shugart and Carey (1992) to 0.77, given by the PNUD and 
which is the highest value reached by a country in the indexes considered. This difference 
is, once again, due to the indicators and the score they receive. Thus, whereas Shugart and 
Carey (1992) consider the ability to veto and the powers over the budget intermediate, and 
the ability of exclusive initiative of legislation weak, the rest of the authors situate both the 
presidential ability to veto, that of exclusive initiative and influence on the budget in a high 
position.   
3. The political variables  
Despite the fact that the discussion about the relationship between the Legislative and the 
Executive has a strong institutional component, it is true that the normative prerogatives 
do not explain it fully. In unstable political systems the Constitutions change frequently and 
in many countries there is a break between what appears in the text of the constitution and 
what really happens (Mezey, 1993: 352-353).  
Thus, the legislative process and its products depend not only on the institutional design of 
the countries but also on the political actors participating in it, on their strategies when 
adapting to the institutional network, and on their collective and individual interests. The 
configuration of the political parties is, therefore, crucial for understanding the 
relationships between the Executive and Legislative Powers. 
 3.1. The presence of the parties in the legislature 
3.1.1. Legislative majorities  
One of the basic characteristics of presidential systems is the fact that the Executive Power 
does not depend on a legislative majority for its forming. Hence, one of the first evident 
hypotheses that emerged from the new institutionalism when dealing with this type of 
system was the one that links the composition of the Congress to the Executive’s ability to 
carry out its public policies. If the government does not have sufficient majority in the 
legislature, it will have greater difficulties in carrying through its agenda than if it has the 
support of an ample percentage of seats in the Congress, since the president should receive 
more support from the legislators elected by his/her own party than from those of other 
parties. Moreover, given that in presidential systems both branches of power are 
independent –not only are they separate as regards the functions they perform but also as 
regards the political interests they represent and the purposes they each pursue (Cox and 
McCubbins, 2001) – if there is no cooperation between the president and the Congress, 
situations such as political stagnation, legislative bottleneck and even the fall of the 
government can occur (Linz, 1990; Mainwaring, 1993; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997).  
This basic idea that presidents in minority have greater difficulties in governing has given 
rise to many studies and hypotheses in Latin America. Thus, among the consequences of  
having an Executive Branch in the minority, it has been affirmed that the Executive uses 
unilateral constitutional powers, such as the decree, in order to carry through its agenda12 
                                                 
12 When a president has an ample legislative majority, the use of unilateral power of decree is not very 
important for attaining political goals (Cox and Morgenstern, 2001) and, on the contrary, when the majority 
of the Congress has faith in the president as an agent, he/she can delegate power of decree in the Executive 
in order to speed up the legislative agenda (Carey and Shugart, 1998; Pérez and Rodríguez, 2003) 
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(Ferreira and Goretti, 1996; Cox and Morgenstern, 2001); strengthening of the role of the 
“median party” to define the modification of the status quo (Nacif, 2005; Negretto, 2002) 
and the need to form coalitions in order to govern (Chasquetti, 2001; Amorim, 1998; 
Pérez, 2000, Altman, 2001). All these consequences arise from the strategy the president 
takes to overcome the minority situation. The hypothesis maintained in this study with 
respect to the composition of the Congress and its relationship with the legislative activity 
is that in the cases in which the party in government or the parties in the coalition government maintain an 
ample majority in the parliament, success in the passing of their proposals will be greater.  
Table C in the appendix summarizes the percentage of legislators that support the 
Executives under study in this research. To build the indicator that measures the legislative 
majorities, both the percentage of seats obtained by the president –in the lower and upper 
chambers- and the increase in this percentage in those cases in which the presidents 
formed a coalition were taken into account. The latter is important, since these legislators 
whose parties come to form part of the Executive are more likely to support the president 
than if they remain in the opposition. Finally, these percentages were used to prepare the 
indicator that appears in the last column of the table mentioned, which is used to contrast 
the importance of legislative majorities in the legislative activity and which contains the 
total percentage of legislators in both chambers who belonged to the governing party or 
parties after the coalitions were formed, if such was the case.     
3.1.2. Fragmentation or effective number of parties 
Party fragmentation is considered to be one of the most important dimensions when 
informing on the dispersal or concentration of the political system. Evidently, there is a 
great association between fragmentation, legislative majorities and the forming of 
coalitions, since it is to be expected that, as the number of parties increases, the proportion 
of seats of the president’s party will decrease and, therefore, the difficulty in forming 
majorities in order to govern will increase and coalitions will be formed (Mainwaring, 2002; 
Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997, Altman, 2001). In presidential contexts, the multi-party 
system has been considered as a potentially dangerous factor for the stability of 
democracies (Mainwaring, 1993) although an ever-increasing number of authors considers 
that the danger depends on the ability to form coherent and stable coalitions when the 
number of parties is high (Chasquetti, 2001; Cheibub et al, 2002).  
As regards the effects that the number of parties in the system has on the legislative 
activity, Sartori (1999:151) stated that the greater the number of parties (having a voice) the 
greater the complexity and probably the complication of the system will be. Thus, the 
greater the number of parties, the greater the transaction costs and the possibilities of 
stagnation (Cox and McCubbins, 1999). In the same line, Mainwaring (2002: 79) 
maintained that as the fragmentation of the party system increases, the president’s ability to 
obtain what he/she desires decreases. Therefore, the hypothesis to be tested is that the 
existence of a high number of parties tends to limit the possibilities of finding support for the policies 
proposed by the Executive, which will make its degree of success decrease. This is strengthened by the fact 
that the increase in the number of players in the Congress reduces the ability to influence the chamber as a 
collective player.13 However, it should be mentioned that this statement also depends on the 
positions of the political parties. If the political parties other than the president’s party have 
positions close to those of the latter with respect to certain policies, then the difficulties for 
the Executive associated with a significant fragmentation should decrease, which 
                                                 
13 On the  effects of the increase in the number of players, see Tsebelis (2002) 
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introduces the subject of polarization which, for Sartori (1994, 1999), is inseparable from 
fragmentation, as will be seen below.   
One of the first indexes for calculating fragmentation was the one proposed by Rae in 
1971, called fragmentation index,14 which can take two values, depending on whether the 
strength of the parties is considered in terms of votes (electoral results) or in terms of seats. 
The difference between one value and the other depends on the distortion that the 
electoral system introduces in the proportionality between votes and seats. The value of 
this index ranges from 0 to 1, although the index most used for measuring the dispersion 
of political power is the one proposed by Laakso and Taagepera in 1979, called effective 
number of parties.15 This indicator basically offers the same information as that of Rae, but, 
unlike it, it has the advantage of making it easier to appreciate how many parties compete 
in the elections and how many compete in the Congress, taking into account in both cases 
their respective relative sizes16 (Oñate and Ocaña, 1999:36-37). In order to measure 
fragmentation, this study uses the latter index calculated from the seats.17 Table D in the 
appendix gives the effective number of parties present in both the Lower Chamber and the 
Senate for each Latin American period of government studied and the total that 
corresponds to the mean of both Chambers –in the case of bicameral countries- is shown 
in Figure 3.  
                                                 
14 Rae’s formula for calculating the fragmentation index is , pi being the proportion of votes or 


















1 , pi being the proportion of votes 
or seats of each party. 
16 The values of the effective number of parties index generally range in the +/-1 interval of the actual 
number of parties which ranges more than 10% of the vote. The value of this indicator will, therefore, be 
lower in the usual case in which not all the parties achieve similar results (Oñate and Ocaña, 1999:37). 
17 If each party has the same amount of seats, the effective number of parties will actually be equal to the 
number of parties with parliamentary representation.  
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Ri car do Lagos (2000-2005)
Jami l  Mahuad (1998-2002)
Si xto Dur an Bal len (1995-1996)
Abdalá Bucar am (1996-1997)
Fabián Alar cón (1997-1998)
 Eduar do Fr ei  (1997-2000)
Patr i cio Al wyn / Eduar do Fr ei  (1993-1996)
Patr i cio Alwyn (1989-1993)
 Eduar do Fr ei  (1996-1997)
Abel  Pacheco (2002-2006)
Hugo Bánzer / Jor ge Qui r oga (1997-2001)
Raf ael  Cal der a (1969-1974)
Raúl  Leoni  (1964-1969)
Al ej andr o Tol edo (2001-2005)
Er nesto Pér ez Bal l adar es (1994-1997)
Alber to Fuj i mor i  (2000-2001)
Andr és Pastr ana (1998-2002)
José Fi guer es (1994-1998)
Mi r eya Moscoso (1999-2004)
Jul io M. Sangui netti  (1994-1999)
Jor ge Battl e (1999-2004)
Fer nando de la Rúa (1999-2001)
Alber to Fuj i mor i  (1995-2000)
Fer nando de l a Rúa/ Eduar do Duhalde (2001-2003)
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (1993-1997)
Car l os S. Menem (1997-1999)
Car l os S. Menem (1991-1993)
Ál var o Ar zú (1995-1999)
Raúl  Al f onsín (1987-1989)
Car l os S. Menem (1995-1997)
Car l os S. Menem (1993-1995)
Néstor  Kichner  (2003-2004)
César  Gavi r i a (1990-1994)
Raúl  Cubas Gr au (1998)
Car l os S. Menem (1989-1991)
Miguel  A. Rodr íguez (1998-2002)
Car l os A. Pér ez (1974-1979)
Raúl  Al f onsín (1985-1987)
Lui s H Campins (1979-1984)
Raúl  Al f onsín (1983-1985)
Rómulo Betancour t (1959-1964)
Andr és Rodr íguez (1989-1993)
Luis A. Gonzál ez Macchi  (1998-2002)
Jai me Lusinchi  (1984-1989)
Car los Fl or es (1997-2001)
Car l os Reina (1993-1997)
Car los Sal inas de Gor tar i  (1988-1991)
Raf ael  Cal lejas (1989-1993)
Er nesto Zedi l lo(1997-2000)
Juan Car l os Wasmosy (1993-1998)
Vicente Fox (2000-2003)
Er nesto Zedi l l o  (1994-1997)
Car los Sal inas de Gor tar i  (1991-1994)
Mi guel  de la Madr i d (1985-1988)
Mi guel  de la Madr i d (1982-1985)
 Effective number of parliamentary parties 
Source: own  
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3.1.3. Coalitions 
Strom (1990) defined the coalition as a set of political parties that agree to pursue common 
goals, join resources for materializing them and distribute the benefits of the achievement 
of these goals. These coalitions may be pre-electoral or may be formed after the elections. 
The forming of coalition Executives as well as their survival and effectiveness is a subject 
that has been dealt with extensively by researchers taking parliamentary systems as the 
study object.18 However, until recently this matter had not been studied in Latin American 
countries, since it was thought that presidentialism generated fewer incentives for 
cooperation in a coalition (Stepan and Skach, 1993: 20) because under this type of 
government, party discipline cannot be trusted to occur (Mainwaring, 1993). Nevertheless, 
from 1995 onwards important studies on presidential systems in the region began to appear 
(Amorim, 1998; Deheza, 1998; Altman, 2001; Chasquetti, 2001; Lanzaro, 2001; Garrido, 
2003; Cheibub et al., 2002) which revealed that coalition governments are set up in the 
region fairly frequently.   
The matter of coalitions is closely linked to the legislative majorities, since the decision to 
share the Executive among several parties depends on the percentage of seats obtained by 
the president’s party.19 The hypothesis the study tests is that governments composed of one single 
party with a legislative majority will have greater success in having their proposals passed than those 
composed by a coalition, especially if the latter comprises a high number of political parties since the 
increase in the number of actors makes the president’s control over them and decision-
making more difficult.20  
In order to measure the variable for coalition and number of parties in the government a 
numerical scale has been set up that ranges from 1 to 5. The value of 5 is assigned to the 
periods of sessions in which the Executive is occupied by a single party which also has a 
percentage of seats higher than or equal to 50%, as can be seen in Table 3.   
 
 
                                                 
18 See Riker (1962); De Swaan (1973); Dodd (1976); Budge and Keman (1990); Laver and Schofield (1990); 
Strom (1990); Laver and Shepsle (1996); Mershon, (1999) Müller and Strom (2000).  
19 Deheza (1998) groups governments into two types a) single-party government and b) coalition government. 
The latter may be majority governments when they have support equal to or higher than 50% of the seats or 
minority governments when they control a percentage lower than the absolute majority. Although the 
forming of coalitions entails benefits for both the president and the parties forming it, it can also entail risks, 
since decision-making must have a greater number of actors, which limits the president’s control while 
situations of lack of discipline can always occur. 
20 See Tsebelis (1995, 1998). 
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Table 3: Periods of government analyzed and number of parties in the Executive 
Single-party government with 
majority 
Government formed 
by one party in 
minority 
Coalition formed by 
two parties 
Coalition formed by 3 
parties 
Coalition formed by 4 
parties or more 
Argentina 
-Carlos S. Menem (1989-
1995) 




-Néstor Kichner (2003-2007) 
Colombia 
-César Gaviria (1990-1994) 
Guatemala 
-Álvaro Arzú (1995-1999) 
Honduras 
-Rafael Callejas (1989-1993) 
-Carlos Reina (1993-1997) 
-Carlos Flores (1997-2001) 
Mexico 
-Miguel de la Madrid (1982-
1988) 
-Carlos Salinas de Gortari 
(1988-1994) 




-Juan Carlos Wasmosy 
(1993-1998) 
-Raúl Cubas Grau (1998) 
-Luis A. González Macchi 
(1998-2002) 
Peru 
-Alberto Fujimori (1995-2000) 
Venezuela 
-Carlos A. Pérez (1974-1979) 
























Fernando de la Rúa 
(1999-2002) 
Ecuador 













































1 2 3 4 5 
     
Unfavorable to the intervention of the Executive in legislative 
activity 
Favorable to the intervention of the Executive in legislative activity 
 
Source: own 
The table shows that during the 1990s and the first years of the 2000s, although it was not 
the most frequent situation, the forming of coalitions in Latin American countries was 
common, which to some extent contradicts the expectations of the critics of 
presidentialism, who considered that such alliances had no ability to avoid the dual 
legitimacy and the trend to stagnation typical of systems with separation of power (Payne et 
al., 2003:225). Of the 47 presidential periods analyzed, 26 were single party governments, 
19 had an absolute majority and 8 governed in minority. The rest of the presidential 
periods (19) dealt with were coalition governments, 10 of which were formed by two 
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political parties, 3 Executives were formed by three parties and during 5 presidential 
periods the coalition was formed by four parties. The countries that stand out for having 
single-party governments with an absolute majority are Honduras, Paraguay and 
Guatemala, whereas the cases that concentrate coalitions with a larger number of parties 
are Bolivia, Chile, and Panama21, countries which, as has been seen above, have greater 
party fragmentation. 
3.2. The attitudes of the legislators 
3.2.1 Ideological polarization 
For Sartori and Sani (1992) the fragmentation of the party system may reflect a situation of 
segmentation or a situation of polarization, that is, of ideological distance22. Hence, they 
maintain that there is something fundamental that cannot be detected except by counting 
the political parties, since “fragmentation hinders the functioning of democracy if (and only 
if) it expresses the existence of polarization” (Sartori and Sani, 1992:448). For these 
authors, when a system shows low values of polarization, a democracy can work even when 
its party system is fragmented, its social structure segmented and its political culture 
heterogeneous, since polarization is what determines the stability of the democratic system. 
Furthermore, and once again, this variable is highly related to those given in previous 
sections since whether competition is centripetal or centrifugal depends on it. If 
competition is centrifugal and the party system is fragmented, government coalitions will 
not be very viable (Oñate and Ocaña, 1999: 40). Hence, knowledge of polarization makes it 
possible to understand the forces that promote political agreements or render them unfit23 
and, consequently, allows spatial models of the forming of coalitions to be tested24 
(Altman, 2002: 90).  
This variable is important for this research as it makes it possible to approach the degree of 
moderation or conflict in the relations between the Executive and Legislative branches 
since, as Mainwaring and Scully (1995:33) affirm, there is an inversely proportional 
                                                 
21 Although in these three countries the forming of coalition governments in the period studied was of crucial 
importance for their political system it should be pointed out that there are great differences between the 
Chilean coalitions, on the one hand, and the Bolivian and Panamanian ones, on the other hand. In Chile, the 
five parties that form the Concertación por la democracia (Coalition for Democracy) -Partido Demócrata Cristiano 
(PDC), Partido Socialista (PS), Partido por la Democracia (PPD) and Partido Radical Socialdemócrata 
(PRSD)- and the two that form the Union for Chile -Renovación Nacional (RN) and Unión Demócrata 
Independiente (UDI)-, are structured in quite different and conflicting ideological positions, owing to the  
view they have of the authoritarian past and its legacy  to democracy. All the Executives that have arisen in 
the most recent democratic period in Chile have been part of the Concertación and, despite the existence of 
trends within it, a certain consensus has been ensured as to a government program (Nolte, 2003). However, 
the Panamanian and Bolivian coalitions have been highly volatile, mainly because of the lack of a program 
pact in their forming.  This has been subordinated to matters more related to the distribution of the resources 
and benefits of the quotas among the parties. 
22 Sartori (1992) defines polarization as the general sphere of the ideological spectrum of any political 
community. 
23 Mainwaring and Shugart (2002: 260) maintain that if a high percentage of seats is controlled by parties with 
similar ideological positions on most key issues, the need for the president’s party to control a large number 
of legislators decreases, since it is easier to form a coalition. 
24 The literature that connects ideological polarization with government coalitions is very interesting. Some 
authors determine that the mere existence of “centrist” parties affects ideological polarization negatively 
(increasing it) and, consequently, the possibility of a coalition being formed or being able to survive 
diminishes (Hazan, 1997).  
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relationship between the polarization of a party system and the understanding between the 
branches of government. Hence, high ideological polarization hinders the coming together 
of common political areas on which to negotiate or reach agreements (Mainwaring and 
Scully, 1995; Hazan, 1997; Mainwaring and Shugart, 2002; and Altman, 2002). Thus, the 
hypothesis in this research study regarding polarization and its effect on legislative activity 
is that greater ideological distances between the political parties cause greater conflict in the relations between 
the Executive and the Legislative and decrease the president’s success. 
In order to capture polarization Sartori and Sani (1992) suggested seeing how distant the 
ideological positions of the parties are, expressed on a left-right ideological continuum. 
This continuum has traditionally been the backbone of political ideology. However, its use 
has been criticized for several reasons. One is that it may not be relevant in certain political 
systems or it may not contain the major divisions in each national context. A more general 
criticism mentions the emptiness of content of the expressions left and right as symbolic 
referents in today’s world. Its applicability has also been questioned in Latin American 
countries owing, among other reasons, to the emergence of neo-populist electoral 
movements in which the mobilization axis does not respond to the traditional left-right 
ideological scale but rather to the characteristics of the political leadership. Despite all this, 
its use remains widespread among researchers25 owing to the great flexibility and ability to 
adapt that the continuum has had over time and to the fact that it is an ideological referent 
for the political actors and the electors who still situate themselves on the axis, thus 
revealing empirically that there are identifying traits that differentiate the left and the right 
(Zechmeister, 2004; Alcántara, 1991 and 2004; Coppedge, 1998; Ruiz, 2003). Hence, this 
scale will be used here to measure ideological distances, although we are aware that the 
polarization of the parties can always be gone into in greater depth and its understanding 
improved by taking into account other variables which contain fundamental and generic 
divisions in each specific political system, besides the ideological place on the continuum.   
The polarization index of Sartori and Sani (1992:428) refers to the absolute difference of the 
average ideological self-placement of the two most extreme parties of a system divided 
between the theoretical maximum of that difference, which, on a left-right scale of 1 to 10, 
is 9.26 The measurement ranges from 0 to 1; the values close to 1 indicate greater 
ideological distance between the parties. This index is very simple but has a problem 
because of the distortion that can be caused in the result owing to the existence of radical 
parties which, however, are not of great importance in the political system (Hazan 
1997:44). The weighted polarization index overcomes this drawback by calculating polarization 
taking into account both the position each party occupies on the left-right continuum and 
the weight that this party has in the system, measured in terms of votes or seats27(Oñate 
and Ocaña, 1999: 42). In order to prepare both indexes, in this study the data were taken 
                                                 
25 Many authors have focused, and continue to focus, their attention on the left-right continuum to deal with 
polarization (Castles and Meir 1984; Hazan 1997; Kitschelt 1994; Altman, 2002; Jones, 2005).   
26 The formula for the polarization index is as follows: 
9
)( id xxIP −= , where xd  is the party with the most 
extreme ideological placement on the right of the scale and xi is the party with the most extreme ideological 
placement on the left of the scale. 
27 The formula for calculating the weighted polarization index is: , where pi is the 
party’s proportion of seats or votes, xi  is the mean position of the party on the scale of 1 to 10 and the 













from the “Proyecto Elites Parlamentarias Latinoamericanas” (PELA).28 From this 
information, obtained through a questionnaire carried out by means of personal interviews 
with the legislators, in this project a complete database was prepared which contains the 
perceptions and attitudes on several major topics of the members of Congress of 17 
countries in the region from 1994.29 Specifically, the question used to measure polarization 
is the one corresponding to the ideological self-placement of the representatives on the 
left(1)-right(10) scale.30 Table 4 gives the values of Sartori and Sani’s polarization index as 
well as the weighted polarization index for each of the periods of government for which 
data from the project are available and which coincide with those analyzed in this study.  
The Latin American countries with the most polarized party system (see Table 4 and Figure 
4) are Chile,31 Ecuador and Panama although there are important variations by period of 
government.32 Thus, terms of office such as that of Uruguay 1999-2005, Peru 1995-2000 or 
Colombia 1998-2002 can be included; all these are countries which, as a whole, are not 
outstanding for having a highly polarized party system. On the other hand, the countries in 
which the party system has greater ideological homogeneity are Paraguay, Honduras, 
Guatemala and Argentina. Mexico is a special case since although it could be characterized 
as a party system of moderate polarization, the index reveals the existence of an increase in 
the degree of polarization from the first term of office for which information is available 
until the most recent periods.   
                                                 
28 The appendix includes the technical charts of the studies. 
29 Unfortunately the polarization indexes cannot be completed with information on the Upper Chambers. 
Although the project “Functions and Functioning of the Senates in the Southern Cone” of the Institut Für 
Iberoamerika-Kunde of Hamburg made a valuable contribution to research on the Senates in Latin America, 
the databases on the attitudes of the senators obtained by this project are limited to a single legislature. 
Hence, it was decided not to include them in the calculation because of the risk of biasing the polarization 
index calculated.   
30 The wording of the question in the questionnaire is as follows: “As you will remember, when speaking of 
politics the expressions left and right are normally used. On this card there is a series of boxes that go from 
left to right. In which box would you place yourself, taking into account your political ideas?” 
31 In Chile, as has already been said, the political parties are divided into two blocs with clearly differentiable 
ideology- on the one hand the Concertación por la Democracia can be defined as center-left and, on the other the 
Unión por Chile is on the right – as well as by opposing positions concerning the dictatorship of General 
Pinochet. In the political debates, this party division has been reflected as the violation of human rights 
during the military dictatorship or the survival of institutional legacies from the previous regime.  Moreover, 
within the two blocs there are also differences, a fact which undoubtedly affects the value obtained in the 
polarization indicator. Despite this, the Chilean party system has been considered to be one of the most 
institutionalized in the region (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Siavelis, 200) and the country has had no 
democratic stability problems thanks to the collaboration and consensus of the political actors that have 
formed the government coalitions. 
32 The fact that these three countries have in common a fragmented party system lead one to think that there 
may be a relationship between polarization and the number of parties that compete in the political system. 
Further on in the chapter verification will be made of whether or not this relationship occurs. 
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Sartori and Sani’s polarization 
(ideological placement) Most extreme parties 
Argentina  (1995-1997) 0.29 0.08 PJ-FREPASO 
Argentina  (1997-2001) 0.77 0.23 PJ-FREPASO 
Argentina  (2003-2007) 0.72 0.11 PJ-ARI 
Bolivia (1993-1997) 0.88 0.29 ADN-CONDEPA 
Bolivia (1997-2002) 1.16 0.29 ADN-CONDEPA 
Chile (1993-1997) 1.75 0.38 UDI-PS 
Chile (1997-2001) 2.81 0.60 UDI-PS 
Chile (2002-2006) 2.52 0.35 UDI-PS 
Colombia (1998-2002) 1.44 0.23 PC-PL 
Costa Rica  (1994-1998) 0.85 0.30 PUSC-PFD 
Costa Rica  (1998-2002) 0.80 0.15 PUSC-PLN 
Costa Rica  (2002-2006) 0.60 0.14 PUSC-PLN 
Ecuador (1996-1998) 2.79 0.37 PSC-MUPP/NP 
Ecuador (1998-2002) 1.40 0.40 PSC-MUPP/NP 
Guatemala  (1995-1999) 0.42 0.12 PAN-FRG 
Honduras  (1994-1997) 0.35 0.10 PN-PL 
Honduras  (1997-2001) 0.53 0.15 PN-PL 
Mexico (1994-1997) 0.58 0.28 PAN-PRD 
Mexico (1997-2000) 0.71 0.31 PAN-PRD 
Mexico (2000-2003) 0.82 0.31 PAN-PRD 
Panama (1999-2004) 2.03 0.10 PA-PRD 
Paraguay (1993-1998) 0.11 0.09 ANR-PEN 
Paraguay (1998-2003) 0.59 0.11 ANR-PEN 
Peru  (1995-2000) 1.56 0.19 Cambio’90-APRA 
Peru  (2001-2006) 0.58 0.21 Unidad Nacional-UPP 
Uruguay (1995-2000) 0.75 0.21 PN-FA 
Uruguay (1999-2005) 1.67 0.31 PN-EP/FA 
Source: own from PELA. 
As was to be expected, both polarization indexes maintain a very high correlation, 
indicating that their measurements of the ideological distances between the parties are 
similar although not exactly the same. Panama (1999-2004) and Ecuador (1996-1998), as 
can be seen in Figure 4, are the two most outstanding cases in which the values of the two 
indexes do not coincide; thus, whereas Sartori and Sani’s index shows that Panama is a 
country with low levels of polarization, the value of the weighted index reveals a polarized 
party system. Ecuador occupies one of the highest places with respect to its degree of 
weighted polarization, but if Sartori and Sani’s index is taken as a reference it is in an 
intermediate position. This difference, in both cases, is due to the nuance introduced by 
weighting with the number of seats, since Panama and Ecuador are two systems with high 
parliamentary fragmentation despite the fact that, in relative terms, there are no great 
ideological distances between the parties. In this research study, therefore, we opted for the 
use of the weighted polarization index for testing the hypothesis that relates this variable to 
legislative activity because it seems to more in harmony with the political situation.    
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Figure 4: Dispersion of the ideological polarization indexes 
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Weighted Polarization Index 
Source: own from PELA 
3.2.2. Ideological coherence of the government party/parties 
Another of the variables that has been mentioned as a factor affecting legislative activity is 
the coherence or consistency maintained by the legislators of the Executive party or the 
parties forming the government coalition. If polarization reflects the ideological distance 
between the parties, coherence seeks to reflect the intra-party distance. This research, 
following Ruiz (2003) and, faced with the confusion caused by the use of the terms 
coherence and cohesion33 as synonyms to reflect the attitudes inside the parties,34 opts for 
the term coherence understood as “the degree of convergence among the members of a 
party in aspects of potential importance in the party-political arena”. Among the 
consequences of low degrees of coherence is the difficulty in achieving political changes 
(Cox and McCubbins, 2001; Tsebelis, 1995, 2002). Thus, if the majority party in the 
congress is distant from the status quo, greater coherence of the party will mean less stability 
in politics. Owing to this reasoning, the authors who analyze presidentialism have assumed 
that predominant and coherent parties facilitate the setting in motion of policies promoted 
by the Executive, whereas parties with little coherence hinder this type of initiative (Cox 
and McCubbins, 2001). Nevertheless, if the party with the majority in the Congress is 
identified with the status quo, the greater coherence of the party will give greater stability to 
                                                 
33Party cohesion refers to the homogeneity or unity of the members of the party in their behavior, normally 
referring to voting in the Chambers. 
34 A clear difference between the two concepts and others used for reflecting the party universe can be seen 
in Ruiz and García (2003) and Ruiz (2003). 
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politics (Pérez and Rodríguez, 2003). The hypothesis to be tested in this research study is 
that the existence of greater degrees of coherence among the legislators in the president’s party or in the 
parties forming the government coalition will increase the legislative success of the Executive since smaller 
attitudinal distances among the legislators of the government party or parties will make it 
easier to achieve cooperation and reach agreements for modifying and preparing public 
policies.  
In order to reflect the degree of coherence of the political party or parties that support the 
president, the ideological coherence that is “the degree of intra-party agreement in the 
ideological self-placement of its member” has been used (Ruiz, 2003). The restricted use of 
the ideological dimension, the same as occurred with the polarization variable, is not 
entirely correct since there is a variety of dimensions with respect to which the legislators 
can show different levels of coherence. Thus, Ruiz and García (2003) distinguish between 
two dimensions: programmatic and ideological, to which Ruiz (2003) adds a third, 
organizational. In each of these dimensions the levels of coherence revealed by the 
legislators of one same party may be heterogeneous; however, in this study we opt for the 
ideological coherence expressed on the left-right continuum in order to test its effect on 
legislative activity. Although it entails a risk of losing information, this dimension was 
chosen because it gains in simplicity, the different political systems become more 
comparable and also because of the ability this axis has to structure ideology and group 
attitudes symbolically, as mentioned when referring to the polarization variable.  
The indicator used for measuring the degree of ideological coherence is standard deviation 
(Ruiz and García, 2003; Ruiz, 2003) which shows the distance between the position in 
which the legislators place themselves on the ideological scale [(1)left-(10)right] and the 
mean for the whole government party or parties on this scale.35 It therefore shows the 
variability of the legislators on the left-right continuum in relation to the mean position of 
their party/parties. The data used for constructing the indicator were extracted from the 
research project mentioned, PELA;36 Figure 5 gives the summary of the values they adopt 
for the period of office as well as the party or coalition corresponding to the period which 
was the starting point for calculating ideological coherence.37
 
                                                 
35 Standard deviation is defined as the square root of the variance. The latter is the mean of the square of the 
differences of n scores with respect to their arithmetical mean.  It expresses the variability of the scores of the 
subjects in a variable. Standard deviation is used instead of variance because the latter is expressed in units 
squared whereas standard deviation is expressed in the same unit as the variable measured.  The formula for 














; where xi is the value offered by each subject in the 
variable x (ideological self-placement of the legislator in our case),  is the mean value for all the subjects 




36 As with the ideological polarization variable, the question selected from the questionnaire is the one 
referring to the ideological self-placement of the legislators: “As you will remember, when speaking of politics 
the expressions left and right are normally used. On this card there is a series of boxes that go from left to 
right.  In which box would you place yourself, taking into account your political ideas?” 
37 The calculation of the coherence of the party or parties supporting the government may not include all the 
political parties that formed the coalition. This only occurs in those cases in which a party has a small number 
of seats and, given its scarce importance for representative effects, the PELA Project did not interview its 
legislators.  
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Source: own from PELA  
3.2.3. Attitudinal discipline  
Another of the variables on which there is a widespread consensus that it is able to affect 
the legislative results is legislative discipline. Its influence is due to the fact that the 
president’s ability to carry through political initiatives depends on whether the party or 
parties supporting him/her in the Congress also does so in voting his/her proposals. In 
presidential regimes, unlike in parliamentary systems, the parties do not need to be highly 
disciplined, but lack of discipline often makes it more difficult to establish stable 
relationships between the government, the parties and the Congress. Hence, if there is no 
unity in the legislators’ vote, the presidents may not be able to promote their legislative 
agendas. Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) consider that discipline, together with the 
percentage of legislators that belong to the president’s party, shapes the president’s party power 
and this, if it is weak, makes political changes difficult and leads to institutional blocking. 
The literature has, therefore, linked low discipline to political and legislative paralysis 
 22 
(Archer and Shugart, 1997; Crisp, 1997; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997; Cox and 
McCubbins, 2001; Mustapic, 2002), although it has also been related to the increase in the 
personal vote on the part of the legislators as well as to the decrease in motivation for 
giving support to public products (Ames, 2001; Carey and Shugart, 1995; Pérez and 
Rodríguez, 2003). Consequently, the hypothesis that relates this variable to legislative 
activity is that low levels of discipline in the government party or parties lead to a decrease in the 
Executive’s success rates.   
In order to be able to test the hypothesis posed, an indicator must be found that measures 
discipline, since measurements of party discipline constructed from the vote do not reflect 
the cost of obtaining party support because voting comes at the end of the negotiations 
between the presidents, party leaders and legislators. What would be necessary for 
understanding the previous process, which, in general, is what is lacking, is the direction 
towards which the representatives lean during the processes of negotiation (Mustapic, 
2000; Ames, 2000). Thus, García and Marenghi (2003) suggest understanding legislative 
discipline as “the tendency of the legislators of the same party to follow the lines marked by 
the party in congressional voting and unity in behavior at the time of voting.” Hence, for the 
authors, discipline has two dimensions: on the one hand an attitudinal dimension and, on 
the other hand, a behavior (cohesion) dimension. The attitudinal dimension is given by the 
values that each legislator has individually, and which form part of their own heritage and 
motivate them, previously, to make a decision that may or may not go in the direction of 
the designs set by the party to which they belong. The behavior dimension of discipline 
corresponds to the vote that the legislator actually casts in the Congress. For García and 
Marenghi (2003) discipline cannot be captured without taking both dimensions into 
account, since it is at the time of making the decision of how to vote, marked by the 
legislator’s attitude toward discipline, when a change of trend can occur towards what the 
party lays down or toward what the legislator previously thought he/she should vote.   
This is an original way of understanding discipline, since most of the studies dealing with 
the legislative discipline of Latin American parties empirically and/or comparatively38 have 
focused on its measurement in roll-call voting39 which not only does not, in itself, reflect 
                                                 
38 Most of the analyses of discipline in Latin America are case studies among which the following should be 
mentioned:  Figueiredo and Limongi (1995); Mainwaring and Pérez (1997); Carey (1999); Ames (2000), 
Ugalde (2002); Jones (2001), Nacif (2002); Weldon (2002) and Morgenstern (2003). 
39 The most classic and most widely used index is the one proposed by Rice (1928) which is the summatory 
of the difference between the majority percentage and the minority percentage of the vote of the 
parliamentary group present at the time of voting divided between the sum of the majority and minority 
percentages.  This index ranges from 0 to 1; values close to 0 indicate very low discipline and values close to 
1, very high discipline. This index has been criticized mainly because it overestimates the party’s degree of 
discipline, since there are matters that generate a high degree of consensus and which, when included in the 
index, overvalue the existence of discipline. Jones (2001) proposed a way of overcoming this by establishing 
as a selection criterion for roll-call voting that at least 20% of the votes should belong to the losing option. 
However, this decision has been criticized for being arbitrary and able to hide situations of strong discipline.  
Ames (2000: 41-42), when posing the problem of overestimation of discipline with purely procedural or 
unilateral voting, weights the index by the number of representatives that voted and by the closed nature of 
the voting. Another basic issue discussed when preparing the indexes of discipline is the integration of the 
absences of the legislators and abstention (Weldon, 2002). Absences and abstentions can be caused by 
different factors and one of them is that the legislators are absent and/or abstain so as not to have to vote 
against the party and so as not be “punished” for it.  Jones (2001) proposes two indexes: relative discipline 
and absolute discipline. The latter is the one that contemplates those who do not vote and abstentions. 
Another discipline index for roll-call voting is the one proposed by Carey (1999), called weighted unity index, 
which has an element that he calls contested or conflictive and in which the presence or absence of the 
legislators at the time of voting is also included  (García and Marenghi, 2003). 
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discipline but also has some drawbacks. The first is its low implementation in the countries 
in the region, to which is added, in second place, the way in which its use is regulated. In 
some countries, such as Argentina and Paraguay, roll-call voting only takes place for certain 
laws and on certain occasions, that is, it is for special use, whereas in other countries, such 
as Peru and Brazil, roll-call voting is the norm (García and Marenghi, 2003). Obviously, this 
makes comparison between countries difficult. Another drawback in the use of this 
indicator is the difficulty in gaining access to the complete data for this type of voting. 
Hence, in this study, without wishing to obviate the importance of voting as a reflection of 
behavior, we focus on the attitudinal dimension of discipline.  
Once again, the data that serve to construct this indicator were taken from the PELA 
research project. Specifically, the items in this questionnaire that reveal the attitude toward 
discipline in the government party or parties are: 1) the attitude toward discipline of vote 
(understood as the predisposition to consider that the vote should be decided freely by the 
legislator or by the party); 2) perception regarding the expulsion of representatives who 
vote against the party’s decision; 3) the attitude toward the tendency to defect (whether the 
seat belongs to the party or to the legislator) and 4) the predisposition of the legislators to 
take into consideration the opinion of the party leaders when making political decisions.40  
With the answers given to these three questions by the legislators in the governing 
party/parties the discipline/attitudinal indicator was constructed, with values ranging from 0 
to 1. In the positions close to 1 were the legislative periods with legislators from the 
government party/parties with the most disciplined attitudes and, at 0, those with attitudes 
less favorable toward maintaining discipline.41 The scores for the periods of office for 
which information is available are given in Figure 6. 
The values in this figure42 do not have to be in harmony with the cohesion or actual 
behavior of the legislators when voting in the plenary in a disciplined way or not.  They 
only show the representatives’ predisposition to act and be influenced by the party in their 
voting. If the parties are faced with legislators with undisciplined attitudes, they will have to 




                                                 
40 The complete text of the questions used is as follows: “The subject of discipline has traditionally given rise 
to highly diverse opinions. With which of the following opinions are you most in agreement?” Party discipline 
should always be demanded in the parliamentary group. Each representative should be allowed to vote 
according to his/her own criterion.  Some matters should be subject to discipline and others not. “Next, I 
would like to know whether you are very much, quite a lot, not very much or not at all in agreement with the 
following statement: a political party should expel a member of Congress who votes against his/her party’s 
political decisions ”; “Sometimes a representative who has been elected in the lists of a certain party later 
decides to break with this party. On these occasions, what do you think the representative should do?: keep 
his/her seat and join another parliamentary group or resign so that another candidate from the party in whose 
lists he/she was elected can occupy it” and “To what extent do you take into account the opinion of your 
party leaders when making political decisions? – very much, quite a lot, not very much, not at all”. 
41 Table E in the appendix shows how the answers were transformed to construct the indicator that reflects 
attitudinal discipline. 
42 During the first stage of the research project, which corresponds to the collection of information for 1993-
1997, the questions selected for measuring attitudinal discipline were not posed; they were included in the 
following stages. Hence, there is no complete information for the whole analysis period. 
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Costa Rica  (2002-2006)
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 Attitude less favorable to discipline Attitude more favorable to discipline 
Source: own from PELA. 
3.3. Electoral cycle 
A final explanatory factor considered in this study is the electoral cycle. It is included 
because of the existing consensus concerning the idea that, after the presidential election, 
there is a climate favorable to the Executive –“the honeymoon period”- which can be 
taken advantage of by the president to carry through unpopular or conflictive policies. If 
such measures are introduced later on in the period of government, they may find more 
obstacles in their passage, since the likelihood of losing the favor of the Legislature 
increases (Shugart and Carey, 1992; Coppedge, 1994; Mejía, 2000). This relationship, 
between legislative support for the president and the electoral cycle, has been considered to 
be one of the main differences between the presidential and parliamentary systems of 
government, since, in parliamentary systems, the legislators’ support for the Executive 
seems guaranteed after the government has been formed. Among the causes considered, 
when referring to presidential systems, for explaining that the Executives lose the support 
of Congress as the next presidential election approaches, is the fact that the party leaders 
have to consolidate their own identities and avoid being penalized for the government’s 
errors (Mainwaring, 1993). Thus, at the end of the presidential term, the parties are more 
concerned with their electoral results and will behave more like vote-seeking actors, and 
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this is even more likely in coalition governments43 (Altman, 2001). Hence, the hypothesis to be 
tested in this research is that in the sessions closest to the year in which the president was elected the 
Executive’s success is greater.  
In order to measure the electoral cycle variable, a scale was prepared with values that group 
the units of analysis -the periods of sessions- according to their time distance from the 
presidential election, measured in years. The percentile distribution of the periods of office 
analyzed here according to this scale is summarized in Table 5. This table also shows that 
the periods of office taken into account in the research are divided similarly in the different 
years of the electoral cycle, except for the fifth year. This is because there are very few 
countries in which the presidential period lasts five years; in most Latin American cases the 
cycle is 4 years.   
Table 5: Distribution of the periods of sessions according to the electoral cycle. 
 The presidential 
election was held in 
that same period of 
sessions 
1st 2nd 3 rd  4th 5th year Total 
N 19 26 26 22 12 3 108 
% 17.6 24.1 24.1 20.4 11.1 2.8 100% 
        
 Favors the influence of the Executive in legislative 
activity 




3.4. Other explanatory factors 
To sum up, the previous pages have focused on the operationalization of seven variables 
that the institutional literature has considered capable of influencing the legislative activity 
and seven hypotheses have been outlined for testing in the following section. Nevertheless, 
before analyzing the effects of the independent variables defined, two factors must be 
commented which may be explanatory although their weight will not be tested in this 
research, mainly because we lack the necessary data for their measurement and 
operationalization. The first of these variables and the one which is of greatest importance, 
especially for explaining the levels of presidential success, is popular support for the 
Executive.44  
Thus, several studies have called attention to the effect of public opinion on the behavior 
of the Legislative Branch, which can generate greater cooperation of Congress with the 
president, provided that the president has ample public backing. This relationship has been 
                                                 
43 There are several case studies for Latin America that attempt to prove the existence of this relationship 
empirically, such as Coppedge (1994) for Venezuela, Conaghan (1994) and Mejía (2000) for Ecuador, Carey 
(1997) for Costa Rica and Ajenjo (2004) for Central America. The results given by Ajenjo (2004: 135) seem, 
however, to be contrary to the hypothesis maintained by other authors, since she corroborates an increase in 
the control of the legislative agenda by the Executive in the last year of the electoral cycle, whereas in the 
preceding years the influence of the Executive does not show significant variations. 
44 This variable was formulated by the literature on rational choice when dealing with the United States 
Congress.  The proposition, given that the president has very little ability for legislative initiative, is that for a 
policy that the Executive is interested in to be accepted by Congress, first, both the president and the 
initiative must enjoy popular support (Groseclose and McCarty 2001; McCubbins et al, 2005). 
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stressed in case studies in Latin American countries, such as those carried out by 
Mainwaring (1997) for Brazil, Altman (2000) for Uruguay and Calvo (2004) for Argentina. 
In order to evaluate the weight of this factor in the legislative activity, homogeneous public 
opinion bases would be necessary for the 14 countries on which this study focuses, as well 
as the evaluation the citizens make of the different presidents over time and, despite the 
efforts made to collect this information, it has not been possible to obtain it.  
Another variable that is difficult to measure, and hence its empirical testing has been 
rejected, is the composition of the cabinet of the Executive. Amorin (1998; 2006) proposed 
an interesting theoretical model that explains how the forming of the cabinets helps the 
president to carry through his/her legislative agenda.45 Hence, the composition of the 
Executive’s ministerial team can help to predict their levels of success.  It has not been 
possible to find out the composition of the cabinets and their ministerial changes for the 40 
presidential periods this study covers, therefore its influence cannot be shown.  
4. Towards an explanation of presidential success 
4.1. Interactions between the party variables  
In the previous section it was mentioned that many of the variables that define the political 
parties are related to each other, so that some may be the effect of others. In order to verify 
the relationships between these seven explanatory factors, we considered it appropriate to 
run a correlation analysis to find the degree of influence and relationship among them. 
Table 6 gives the results of the analysis and reveals the existence of some very strong pairs 
of associations. The correlation between the effective number of parliamentary parties and 
the existence of broad government coalitions is outstanding (0.765). Hence, in party 
systems characterized by a high number of political actors in Congress, the forming of 
government coalitions is much more frequent. Another of the relationships the data show 
is that between the forming of coalitions and ideological polarization (0.630). In systems in 
which the political parties are more polarized more coalition governments occur.   
This relationship, however, needs explaining, since both variables show a high association, 
not because the ideological distances help coalitions to be formed, but rather because in 
fragmented party systems, in which coalitions are more likely, polarization is higher (0.735). 
This is endorsed by Downs’ theory (1957), according to which the most rational strategy 
for parties in systems in which a high number compete is to produce a specific and 
integrated ideology which differentiates the party from the rest as a way to achieve greater 
electoral support. On the other hand, in two-party systems, the most rational strategy a 
party can follow is to produce a diffuse and moderate ideology, thus showing lower degrees 
of polarization.  
Figure 7 shows the dispersion of the different periods of government in the crossing of the 
weighted polarization and fragmentation variables. The trend line clearly reflects the 
                                                 
45 Presidents may have two strategies for setting their policies in motion: the first is based on the use of the 
ordinary legislative process and, therefore, has to take heed of the legislators’ opinions and interests, and the 
second is based on the use of their legislative powers and constitutional prerogatives such as the decree and 
the veto. If the goal is to carry the legislation through parliament, the president must form a majority 
government and, consequently, appoint members of the parties for the different ministries on a proportional 
basis according to whether or not the government is a coalition. If the goal is to legislate through unilateral 
initiatives, then the president may form the cabinet with technocrat ministers (Amorin, 2006:423). Mejía 
(2000) proposes a hypothesis in this sense for the case of Ecuador. 
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existence of the aforementioned positive linear relationship between the number of parties 
and ideological polarization. Specifically, Chile and Ecuador are the two countries that 
stand out by occupying the most extreme position in both variables and, therefore, in the 
last decade46 their presidents have had as their counterpart parliaments with high 
ideological polarization, formed by a high number of influential parties. Other Latin 
American presidents who acted in contexts of high fragmentation, albeit with a less 
extreme situation as regards degree of polarization, were Alejandro Toledo in Peru and 
Hugo Bánzer in Bolivia, although in most of the Latin American presidential periods of 
office considered in this study the effective number of parties in the parliament did not 
reach extreme pluralism. Thus, the presidents of Argentina, Honduras and Paraguay, 
among others, acted in two-party scenarios or scenarios of two and a half parties with low 
polarization; this situation was more frequent in Latin America.47
                                                 
46 This was the context of Patricio Alwyn, Eduardo Frei and Ricardo Lagos in Chile and of Abadalá Bucaram 
and Fabián Alarcón in Ecuador. 
47 In order to verify that this high correlation between fragmentation and polarization is not being biased by 
the calculation of the indicators, since the number of seats intervenes in both, another analysis was performed 
between polarization and fragmentation, using Sartori and Sani’s index in which the formula does not use the 
composition of the Congress but, as seen in the previous section, only the distance between the two most 
extreme parties and, as the results show, this association is confirmed, since the correlation index continues to 
be very high (0.702**). 
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0.144      
Sig. (bilateral) 0.295      
 




N 55      
Pearson’s 
correlation 
-0.018 -0.306(**)     
Sig. (bilateral) 0.897 0.001     
Legislative majority 
 
N 55 118     
Pearson’s 
correlation 
0.429(**) 0.735(**) -0.260(*)    




  N 53 78 78 78   
Pearson’s 
correlation 
-0.211 0.046 0.118 -0.089   




  N 53 78 78 78 78  
Pearson’s 
correlation 
-0.077 -0.049 0.038 0.000 0.000  
Sig. (bilateral) 0.583 0.618 0.696 0.999 0.999  
Number of years 
since presidential 
election 
  N 53 108 108 75 75 108 
Pearson’s 
correlation 
0.302(*) 0.765(**) 0.017 0.603(**) 0.002 0.103 
Sig. (bilateral) 0.025 0.000 .857 0.000 0.988 0.290 
Coalition and 
number of parties in 
the government  
N 55 118 118 78 78 108 
**  Correlation significant at level 0.01 (bilateral). 
*  Correlation significant at level 0.05 (bilateral). 
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Figure 7: Dispersion of the periods of government on the crossing of the fragmentation and polarization variables 
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Source: own from the composition of the Congress and PELA. 
Other significant correlations, although much more moderate, are those established 
between: ideological polarization and attitudinal discipline (0.429), which shows that the 
legislators most identified with and open to following the guidelines dictated by their 
parties are those that act in contexts with great ideological polarization; fragmentation and 
legislative majorities (-0.306), showing that the greater the number of parties in the 
parliament, the lower the percentage of legislators the government controls;48 forming 
coalitions and attitudinal discipline (0.302), which indicates that in governments composed 
of a greater number of parties attitudinal discipline is higher; and legislative majorities and 
the degree of ideological polarization, whereby in systems in which the government has a 
more solid majority there is a lower degree of ideological polarization in the political 
parties.49 Finally, the only variable among those considered which is not linked to the 
political actors is the electoral cycle and, as might be expected, it has no statistically 
                                                 
48 This association is not very high. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that in order to calculate the 
legislative majorities the negotiations of the Executive for forming larger majorities were taken into account, 
besides the composition of the Congress arising from the elections. Therefore, the indicator that measures 
the legislative majority includes not only the president’s party but also the rest of the parties that support 
him/her. This undoubtedly moderates the relationship between the two variables. 
49 Although some of these relationships are very interesting and open up new roads of research, they are 
beyond the specific objective of this study. 
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significant relationship with any of the other explanatory factors that refer to the party 
system.   
The correlations found in the previous analyses empirically confirm the existence of very 
strong associations between some of the variables linked to the party system. However, 
their impact on legislative activity remains to be tested; this will be dealt with in the 
following pages. In order to test the hypotheses, multiple regression analysis was chosen as 
a route to find the possible relationships between the independent variables defined and 
the rates of presidential success.   
Among the conditions necessary for guaranteeing the validity of the statistical model 
chosen is non-collinearity. As has been observed, three of the independent variables 
defined (parliamentary fragmentation, ideological polarization and existence of coalitions 
and number of parties forming them) show very high association, Pearson’s correlation 
index being higher than 0.5,50 thus revealing a linear relationship among them. It was 
therefore decided to eliminate the variable for coalition and the number of parties forming 
it, since the information it provides was considered to be already contained, to a large 
extent, in the variable for party fragmentation in the Congress, given that the forming of 
these governments depends, as has been seen, on the number of parties present in the 
parliament.  
Furthermore, we decided to merge two variables: ideological polarization and 
fragmentation, as we considered that, although they are related, they refer to different 
issues. In order to merge the two factors without losing the information they contain a new 
indicator was created in the form of a scale ranging from 1 to 4.551. Predominant party 
systems with low polarization would be situated at 1 and extreme pluralism systems with 
high polarization at the maximum value, 4.5. The hypothesis to be tested is that in the 
periods of sessions in which a large number of highly polarized parties act, the Executive’s success will 
be lower than in those periods in which the number of parties present in the Congress is lower and their 
ideological distance is small.   
Figure 8 groups the countries according to the value they take in the new indicator arising 
from the merging of the polarization and fragmentation variables. Given that in the period 
analyzed in this research elections have been held in the different countries to renew both 
the Executive and the Legislative Branches, the value of the indicator is not the same per 
                                                 
50 Linear relations higher than 0.5 show collinearity. 
51 The procedure for merging was as follows: on the one hand we took the classification of Mainwaring and 
Scully (1995), discussed when referring to the fragmentation variable, which situates the system according to 
the effective number of parties in the predominant party system (when the index is below 1.7), two-party 
system (values between 1.8 and 2.4), two and a half party system (when the effective number of parties is 
between 2.5 and 2.9), moderate pluralism system (index between 3.0 and 3.9) and extreme pluralism (values 
above 4). On the other hand, the ideological polarization variable was classified in three categories: low 
polarization (when the index values are between 0 and 0.94), average polarization (values between 0.95 and 
1.88) and high polarization (1.88 and 2.81, which is the maximum value this index acquires in the systems 
dealt with). Finally, the categories were brought together on a scale ranging from 1 to 4.5, assigning 1 to 
predominant party systems with low polarization, 1.25 to predominant party systems with average 




country, although the trend is for there to be no major changes in the values, since a 
brusque change would mean a point of inflexion in the party system.52  

































































Two-party system with low 
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Predominant party system with low polarization 
Two and a half party system with average polarization  
Two and a half party system with low 
polarization 
Moderate pluralism with low 
polarization 
Extreme pluralism low polarization 
Moderate pluralism with high polarization 
Moderate pluralism with average 
polarization 
Extreme pluralism with 
high polarization 
Extreme pluralism with 
average polarization 
Source: own from the effective number of parties and the  weighted polarization index. 
Degree of fragmentation/polarization 
4.2. Explanatory analysis 
Once the problem of collinearity has been overcome, the explanatory analysis can be 
performed through multiple regression.53 Table 7 summarizes the hypotheses posed –all 
                                                 
52 This is the case of Peru where the three elections occurring during the period of analysis have given rise to 
a different configuration of the party system from the two and a half party system with average polarization 
characteristic of the period (1995-1999), to moderate pluralism with low polarization (2000-2003) or average 
polarization (1999-2000) which is, undoubtedly, an indicator of the relatively low institutionalization and 
stability of the party system during the period.  
53 The function selected for the degree of fit was the ordinary least squares criterion, by means of which the 
sum of the squares of the vertical distances between each point and the regression straight line is minimized. 
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linear, both in negative and positive sense. Two models are proposed for testing them. In 
the first one, the explanatory model for success contains only the independent variables 
relating to the parties and the electoral cycle and the weight of the IPIL is not tested in it.  
In the second model the institutional index has been added to the explanatory factors 
previously mentioned in order to isolate the effects of the party system and the institutional 
effects.   
Table 7: Explanatory hypotheses of legislative activity 
Executive success  Independent variables 
Hypothesis 
Index of legislative institutional 
power (IPIL) 
In the legislative periods characterized by high values in the IPIL the Executive’s success in passing 
its proposals is greater  
Legislative majority In the cases in which the president has the support of an ample percentage of seats in the 




As ideological differences decrease and there is greater coherence between the legislators 
belonging to the coalition party that sustains the Executive, the president’s success increases 
Fragmentation and polarization 
of the party system 
The existence of a large number of highly polarized parties in the Congress reduces the Executive’s 
success  
Attitudinal discipline  Low levels of discipline in the government party or parties lead to a reduction in the Executive’s 
rates of success  
Electoral cycle (number of 
years since the election of the 
president) 
As the period of office moves on from the date of the election of the Executive, the president’s 
success decreases 
Source: own 
In Table 8 it can be seen that in the first model, two of the party factors proposed have a 
significant joint impact on the variability of the Executive’s success. Specifically, the 
ideological coherence of the government party or coalition and the percentage of legislators 
supporting the Executive have an influence on the number of laws the Executive manages 
to pass. These two variables together explain 11% of the variance of presidential success. 
The factor with the greatest statistical strength in the impact on success is a legislative 
majority, thus confirming the starting hypothesis that the control of a higher percentage of 
legislators by the Executive increases the number of initiatives the parliament passes 
corresponding to presidential proposals. Although with less strength, ideological coherence 
also affects the degree of presidential success, since in the periods of office in which the 
party or parties of the executive maintain greater ideological distances at the intra-party 
level, the president achieves a lower percentage in the passing of the initiatives he/she 
presents in the Congress. The explanatory factors that have no statistical strength for 
discriminating the degree of success of the Executive are attitudinal discipline, fragmentation 
and polarization of the parties in the legislature and the electoral cycle, although the sign 





Table 8: Explanatory models of the success of the Executive  
Model 1 Model 2 
Executive success (without IPIL) Executive success (with IPIL)   
Independent variables B Beta t Sig. B Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 100.18
5 
 4.245 0.000** 71.183  3.733 0.001** 
Attitudinal discipline -42.608 -0.082 -1.461 0.154 -41.623 -0.236 -1.861 0.072 
Fragmentation and polarization -1.790 -0.082 -0.512 0.612 -24.810 -1.138 -4.543 0.000** 
Electoral cycle (number of years since the election 
of the president) 
-2.303 -0.161 -0.955 0.347 -5.264 -0.367 -2.701 0.011* 
Coherence of government party/coalition (self-
placement variable) 
-17.876 -0.372 -2.171 0.037** -9.624 -0.201 -1.471 0.151 
Legislative majority 0.479 0.384 2.314 0.027** 0.949 0.761 5.101 0.000** 
IPIL 
    
164.85
6 
1.274 4.838 0.000** 
R2 corrected 0.110 0.476 
**  Relation significant at  0.01 (two-party). 
* Relation significant at 0.05 (two-party). 
The next explanatory model contains, besides the factors that refer to the political parties 
and the electoral cycle, the index that summarizes institutional power. With the 
introduction of the IPIL, prediction of legislative activity improves visibly, as does the 
goodness of fit of the model. 
Taken as a whole, the IPIL, fragmentation and polarization of the parties with 
parliamentary representation, the percentage of legislators with similar interests to the 
government and the electoral cycle explain 47% of the variance in the Executive’s success.   
The two most important variables in the regression equation in this model are the 
institutional index, confirming that institutional designs more favorable to the influence of 
the Executive increase the government’s success significantly, and the existence of a 
legislative majority in favor of the president. The degree of success can also be largely 
explained by the number of parties present in the parliament and their degree of 
polarization, which reveals that the greater the latter the lower the percentage of laws that 
the president manages to carry through. A final variable with significant influence on the 
dependent dimension, although with less weight than the others, is the electoral cycle, 
which confirms the starting hypothesis that newly elected presidents achieve greater 
legislative success.  
These results show that the institutions are important in determining the president’s 
legislative success. Hence, the Executives in Latin American countries achieve greater 
influence if they have institutional benefits, although it also helps if they have ample 
majorities, if the parties present in the parliament are few and ideologically close and if the 
date when they assumed office is recent.   
These results are consistent with most of the hypotheses posed in the research. It is not the 
aim of this study to affirm that the final model found maintains a causal effect at other 
times or in other regions. However, it can be said that these results are not contradictory 
and show validity despite the fact that the explanation of presidential success can be visibly 
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improved with the introduction of other variables, an increase in the sample, or the testing 
of the hypotheses in other regions.    
Conclusions 
This study has analyzed the main variables, linked to political parties, which the 
institutional literature has considered strong enough to intervene in presidential success and 
has tested the weight of these variables, together with the institutional design, in the 
passage rates achieved by Latin American Executives. Six of the explanatory factors 
operationalized in the previous pages are related to the political parties: three focus on their 
number and parliamentary presence (legislative majorities, fragmentation, forming of 
coalitions) and the other three refer to the ideological attitudes shown by the parties 
(polarization, coherence and discipline gathered from the positions of the legislators). 
Besides these variables there are the electoral cycle and the institutions operationalized by 
means of the index of legislative institutional power (IPIL).    
The procedure followed with each of the variables was to first prepare the theoretical 
hypothesis that relates each factor to legislative success, and to then seek the best indicator 
for its measurement and empirical testing. Nevertheless, the description of the values that 
each variable acquires in the different periods and countries analyzed in the research 
offered information beyond that strictly related to the dependent variable. Thus evidence 
was found to show that, although there is a tendency for a legislative bottleneck to occur 
when there is a minority government, this is very slight, which gives nuance to some of the 
suppositions that maintain that when this situation occurs under a form of presidential 
government, it leads to institutional paralysis. Likewise, it was confirmed that the forming 
of coalition governments, although not the majority situation, has in fact occurred fairly 
frequently in Latin American countries, which contradicts the statement by the critics of 
presidentialism who considered that these alliances did not have the ability to prevent dual 
legitimacy and the trend to stagnation typical of this form of government. 
As regards the different explanatory factors, a great deal of the literature links one to 
another. In this chapter it was indeed confirmed that there is a very high association 
between fragmentation and the need to form coalitions as well as between fragmentation 
and ideological polarization. Other more moderate and unfamiliar relationships that merit 
more detailed exploration and which are beyond this study are those found between 
ideological polarization, the forming of coalitions and attitudinal discipline.  
With respect to the determinants of legislative success, the analyses carried out have revealed 
the importance of the institutional index in improving the prediction of presidential success. 
This responds to a linear combination of different variables, but the factors that stand out 
with most influence on variability are the IPIL and legislative majorities. To sum up, the 
scenario that increases the president’s legislative success is characterized by an institutional 
design, defined by the rules of Congress and the Constitution, which favors his/her 
influence, an ample legislative majority, a legislature composed of few parties in which the 
degree of ideological polarization among them is low and a time, in terms of electoral cycle, 




Table A: Institutional hypotheses that guide the construction of the IPIL 
1. Executive success  IPIL indicator 
Hypotheses 
Initiating stage  
Exclusive initiative  In countries in which the Executive has more power of exclusive initiative, success  in the passing of its 
proposals is greater   
Setting of the agenda Procedures concentrated in the hands of few actors for the preparation of the agenda favor the success of 
the Executive in legislative activity  
Type of majority for modifying the agenda Procedures that hinder modification of the agenda favor the success of the Executive  
Constitutive stage  
Committee members 
 
In those countries in which the election of the committee members is more centralized (the responsibility of 
fewer actors)  success of the Executive in legislative activity is higher 
Prerogatives for omitting the committee 
procedure 
The regulations that facilitate obviating the committee stage in the legislative process favor the success of 
the Executive in legislative activity 
Power of the committees for processing laws The greater the legislative prerogatives of the committees, the lesser the success of the Executive 
Ability of the Executive to force urgent 
processing  
In those cases in which the Executive has prerogatives that facilitate the urgent processing of its projects,  
success in passing its initiatives will be greater  
Number of Chambers  In those countries where the legislature has two Chambers success of the Executive is less 
Bicameral  government systems  
Degree of symmetry In countries with a bicameral system in which there is symmetry in both Chambers, the Executive will have 
less success in passing its proposals  
Disagreement between Chambers (total 
rejection) 
 
Asymmetric procedures for solving disagreement between the Chambers when a bill is rejected favors the 
success of the Executive  if one of the  Chambers loses strength of veto 
Disagreement between Chambers 
(modifications) 
In countries with a two-chamber system with more concentrated forms for solving conflicts the Executive’s 
success increases, since it is easier for the legislative group supporting the government in one of the 
Chambers to impose  its criterion  
Effectiveness stage  
Total veto and override In those countries in which in order to override the presidential veto very restrictive majorities are required, 
the  Executive’s success will be greater 
Partial veto and override In those countries in which there is the possibility of partially vetoing bills and override requires very ample 
majorities, the power of veto is stronger and the success of the Executive greater.  
Extraordinary legislative procedure  
Power of decree In those countries in which the power of the president to legislate by decree is contemplated, the legislative 
success of the Executive will be greater 
Calling of extraordinary sessions  In those countries in which  the Executive has facilities for calling extraordinary sessions, its legislative 
success will be greater  
Source: García (2007) 
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Argentina 1853 * * 0 0.65 0.83 1.48 0.49 
Argentina 1853 (1994) 0.13 0.13 0 0.65 0.63 1.54 0.31 
Bolivia 1967 0.61 0.31 0.6 0.25 0.3 2.07 0.41 
Chile 1980 0.86 0.58 0.8 0.65 0.63 3.52 0.70 
Colombia 1991 0.62 0.23 0.4 0.28 1 2.53 0.51 
Costa Rica 1949 0.17 0.31 ** 0.33 0.5 1.31 0.33 
Ecuador 1979 * 0.21 ** 1 0.57 1.78 0.59 
Ecuador 1998 0.41 0.35 ** 1 0.57 2.33 0.58 
Guatemala 1985 0.19 0.46 ** 0.33 0.47 1.45 0.36 
Honduras 1982 0.33 0.5 ** 0.25 0.47 1.55 0.39 
Mexico 1917 0.19 0.38 0.4 0.42 0.17 1.56 0.31 
Panama 1972 0.43 0.42 ** 0.83 0.83 2.51 0.63 
Paraguay 1967 * * 0.2 0.62 1 1.82 0.61 
Paraguay 1992 0.39 0.38 0.2 0.45 0.3 1.72 0.34 
Peru 1993 0.36 0.33 ** 0.1 1 1.79 0.45 
Uruguay 1967 0.49 0.55 0.2 0.47 0.47 2.18 0.44 
Venezuela 1953 * * 0.2 0.65 0.1 0.95 0.32 
Venezuela 1961 * * 0.2 0.65 0.67 1.52 0.51 
Source: own 
*In these cases the prevailing regulations for the constitutional period are lacking, hence the index was calculated taking into account 
only the constitutional prerogatives in the stage and weighting their value over the total value that the index can reach without the  
aforementioned prerogatives being present. 
** Countries with single chamber legislative design. 
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Table C: Percentage of legislators supporting the government  
President 





































Raúl Alfonsín (1983-1985) UCR 51.19 51.19 39.10 39.10 45.15 
(1985-1987) UCR 50.79 50.79 39.10 39.10 44.95 
(1987-1989) UCR 44.49 44.49 39.10 39.10 41.80 
Carlos S. Menem (1989-1991) PJ 48.03 48.03 56.50 56.50 52.27 
(1991-1993) PJ 45.53 45.53 58.30 58.30 51.92 
(1993-1995) PJ 49.03 49.03 58.30 58.30 53.67 
(1995-1997) PJ 51.75 51.75 55.50 55.50 53.63 
(1997-1999) PJ 46.30 46.30 55.50 55.50 50.90 
Fernando de la Rúa (1999-
2001) 
UCR/FREPASO 33.07 48.25 30.60 30.60 39.43 
(2001-2002) UCR/FREPASO 27.63 34.24 30.60 30.60 32.42 
Eduardo Duhalde (2002-2003) PJ 47.50 47.50 65.9 56.9 52.20 
Néstor Kichner (2003-2004) PJ 52.10 52.10 55.50 55.50 53.80 
Bolivia 
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada 
(1993-1997) 
MNR/UCS/MBL 40.0 60.77 62.96 66.66 61.87 




25.38 73.85 40.74 85.18 79.51 
Chile       
Patricio Alwyn (1989-1994) DC/PPD/PS/PR 31.67 51.67 27.65 46.80 49.23 
Eduardo Frei (1994-1997) DC/PPD/PS/PR 29.17 56.67 28.26 45.65 51.16 
 (1997-2000) DC/PPD/PS/PR 30.80 58.33 29.16 41.67 49.99 
Ricardo Lagos (2000-2005) DC/PPD/PS/PR 10.00 53.33 10.41 41.67 47.50 
Colombia 
César Gaviria (1990-1994) PL 59.80 59.80 57.89 57.89 58.84 
Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002) PC 32.30 32.30 14.70 14.70 23.50 
Costa Rica 
José Figueres (1994-1998) PLN 49.12 49.12   49.12 
Miguel A. Rodríguez (1998-
2002) 
PUSC 47.37 47.37   47.37 
Abel Pacheco (2002-2006) PUSC 33.33 33.33   33.33 
Ecuador 
Sixto Duran Ballen (1995-1996) PUR/PCE 2.6 11.69   11.69 
Abdalá Bucaram (1996-1997) PRE/APRE 24.39 28.6   28.6 
Fabián Alarcón (1997-1998) PRE/APRE 24.39 28.6   28.6 
Jamil Mahuad (1998-2002) DP 28.93 28.93   28.93 
Guatemala 
Álvaro Arzú (1995-1999) PAN 53.75 53.75   53.75 
Honduras 
Rafael Callejas (1989-1993) PNH 55.47 55.47   55.47 
Carlos Reina (1993-1997) PLH 55.47 55.47   55.47 
Carlos Flores (1997-2001) PLH 52.34 52.34   52.34 
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(Table C continued: Percentage of legislators supporting the government) 
President 





































Miguel de la Madrid (1982-
1985) 
PRI 74.75 74.75 98.44 98.44 86.60 
(1985-1988) PRI 73.00 73.00 98.44 98.44 85.72 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari 
(1988-1991) 
PRI 52.00 52.00 93.75 93.75 72.88 
(1991-1994) PRI 64.00 64.00 95.31 95.31 79.66 
Ernesto Zedillo  (1994-1997) PRI 60.00 60.00 74.21 74.21 67.10 
(1997-2000) PRI 47.80 47.80 60.15 60.15 53.97 
Vicente Fox (2000-2003) PAN/PARM 41.40 44.60 35.93 35.93 40.27 
Panama 
Ernesto Pérez Balladares 
(1994-1997) 
PRD/PALA/LIBRE 41.79 43.10   43.10 
Mireya Moscoso (1999-2004) PA/PDC/PLN/ 
Solidaridad 
25.4 39.4   39.4 
Paraguay 
Andrés Rodríguez (1989-1993) ANR 66.70 66.70 66.66 66.66 66.69 
Juan Carlos Wasmosy (1993-
1998) 
ANR 47.50 47.50 44.44 44.44 45.97 
Raúl Cubas Grau (1998) ANR 56.30 56.30 53.33 53.33 54.82 
Luis A. González Macchi 
(1998-2002) 
ANR 56.30 56.30 53.33 53.33 54.82 
Peru 
Alberto Fujimori (1995-2000) Cambio90 55.83 55.83   55.83 
Alberto Fujimori (2000-2001) Cambio90 43.33 433.33   43.33 
Alejandro Toledo (2001-2005) PP/FIM 37.50 46.67   46.67 
Uruguay 
Julio M. Sanguinetti (1994-
1999) 
PC/PN 32.30 55.60 33.33 67.67 61.64 




AD/COPEI 54.90 69.17 62.70 74.50 71.84 
Raúl Leoni (1964-1969) AD/FDP/URD 33.17 55.78 46.80 70.20 62.99 
Rafael Caldera (1969-1974) COPEI 27.60 27.60 17 17 22.30 
Carlos A. Pérez (1974-1979) AD 51.00 51.00 59.60 59.60 55.30 
Luis H Campins (1979-1984) COPEI 42.20 42.20 47.70 47.70 44.95 
Jaime Lusinchi (1984-1989) AD 55.90 55.90 63.60 63.60 59.75 
Source: own from composition of the Chambers 
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Table D: Effective number of parliamentary parties in the Chamber of Representatives, Chamber of Senators and total 
of both Chambers by term of office. 
President 





Chamber of Senators 
ENP 
Total  both Chambers 
Argentina    
Raúl Alfonsín (1983-1985) 2.19 2.6 2.4 
(1985-1987) 2.4 2.6 2.5 
(1987-1989) 2.75 2.6 2.68 
Carlos S. Menem (1989-1991) 2.79 2.33 2.56 
(1991-1993) 3.15 2.4 2.78 
(1993-1995) 2.86 2.4 2.63 
(1995-1997) 2.86 2.42 2.64 
(1997-1999) 3.25 2.4 2.83 
Fernando de la Rúa (1999-2001) 3.45 2.4 2.93 
Fernando de la Rúa/Eduardo Duhalde (2001-2003) 3.43 2.35 2.89 
Néstor Kichner (2003-2004) 2.75 2.46 2.61 
Bolivia    
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (1993-1997 3.71 2.05 2.88 
Hugo Bánzer/Jorge Quiroga (1997-2001) 5.5 3.66 4.58 
Chile    
Patricio Alwyn (1989-1993) 5.2 4.83 5.02 
Patricio Alwyn /Eduardo Frei (1993-1996) 4.88 5.26 5.07 
 Eduardo Frei (1996-1997) 4.88 5.14 5.01 
(1997-2000) 5.07 5.14 5.11 
Ricardo Lagos (2000-2005) 6.1 5.36 5.73 
Colombia    
César Gaviria (1990-1994) 3 2.22 2.61 
Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002) 3.28 3.62 3.45 
Costa Rica    
José Figueres (1994-1998) 3.29  3.29 
Miguel A. Rodríguez (1998-2002) 2.56  2.56 
Abel Pacheco (2002-2006) 4.68  4.68 
Ecuador    
Sixto Duran Ballen (1995-1996) 5.44  5.44 
Abdalá Bucaram (1996-1997) 5.13  5.13 
Fabián Alarcón (1997-1998) 5.13  5.13 
Jamil Mahuad (1998-2002) 5.66  5.66 
Guatemala    
Álvaro Arzú (1995-1999) 2.73  2.73 
Argentina    
Honduras    
Rafael Callejas (1989-1993) 2  2 
Carlos Reina (1993-1997) 2.03  2.03 
Carlos Flores (1997-2001) 2.18  2.18 
Mexico    
Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1985) 1.73 1 1.37 
(1985-1988) 1.83 1 1.42 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1991) 3.04 1 2.02 
(1991-1994) 2.21 1 1.61 
Ernesto Zedillo  (1994-1997) 2.29 1 1.65 
(1997-2000) 2.86 1 1.93 
Vicente Fox (2000-2003) 2.55 1 1.78 
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(Table D continued: Effective number of parliamentary parties in the Chamber of Representatives, Chamber of Senators 
and total of both Chambers by term of office.) 
President 





Chamber of Senators 
ENP 
Total both Chambers 
Panama    
Ernesto Pérez Balladares (1994-1997) 4.33  4.33 
Mireya Moscoso (1999-2004) 3.26  3.26 
Paraguay    
Andrés Rodríguez (1989-1993) 1.97 2.55 2.26 
Juan Carlos Wasmosy (1993-1998) 1.89 1.85 1.87 
Raúl Cubas Grau (1998) 2.45 2.69 2.57 
Luis A. González Macchi (1998-2002) 1.97 2.55 2.26 
Peru    
Alberto Fujimori (1995-2000) 2.91  2.91 
Alberto Fujimori (2000-2001) 3.97  3.97 
Alejandro Toledo (2001-2005) 4.37  4.37 
Uruguay    
Julio M. Sanguinetti (1994-1999) 3.3 3.19 3.25 
Jorge Battle (1999-2004) 3.07 3.27 3.17 
Venezuela    
Rómulo Betancourt (1959-1964) 2.58 2.2 2.39 
Raúl Leoni (1964-1969) 5.35 3.46 4.41 
Rafael Caldera (1969-1974) 4.89 4.01 4.45 
Carlos A. Pérez (1974-1979) 2.72 2.3 2.51 
Luis H. Campins (1979-1984) 2.65 2.18 2.42 
Jaime Lusinchi (1984-1989) 2.42 1.99 2.21 
Source: own 
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Table E: Construction of the indicator for attitudinal discipline 
 
Questions used 
“The subject of discipline has traditionally given rise to highly diverse opinions. With which of the following opinions are you most in 
agreement?” Party discipline should always be demanded in the parliamentary group. Each representative should be allowed to vote 
according to his/her own criterion.  Some matters should be subject to discipline and others not 
“Next, I would like to know whether you are very much, quite a lot, not very much or not at all in agreement with the following statement: 
a political party should expel a member of Congress who votes against his/her party’s political decisions” 
“Sometimes a representative who has been elected in the lists of a certain party later decides to break with this party. On these 
occasions, what do you think the representative should do?: keep his/her seat and join another parliamentary group or resign so that 
another candidate from the party in whose lists he/she was elected can occupy it”  
“To what extent do you take into account the opinion of your party leaders when making political decisions? – very much, quite a lot, not 
very much, not at all”. 
Transformation 
The transformations made with the values of the questions for the construction of the indicator were carried out in two steps. First the 
four questions were recoded so that each would acquire a maximum value of 1. Thus, in the question referring to the attitude shown to 
discipline 0 was given to legislators in favor of representatives voting according to their own criterion. On the other hand, the 
representatives who think that discipline of vote should always be demanded were assigned the value 1, whereas those who consider 
that discipline should be subject to the issues obtained a value of 0.5  
The question concerning the degree of agreement with the expulsion of a legislator who votes against the political decisions of his/her 
party was transformed so that those who were not at all in favor of expulsion were given a value of 0, those who were not very much in 
agreement with the expulsion were assigned 0.33, those who were quite in agreement 0.66 and those who were totally in agreement, 1.  
Concerning the opinion as to whether a representative who leaves the party he/she was elected for should keep his/her seat or resign it, 
the value given to those who consider he/she should leave the position as representative is 1, whereas the legislators who thought that 
the seat should be kept received the value of 0.  
The question on the degree to which the legislators take into account the opinion of their party leaders when making political decisions 
was transformed so that those who say they take them greatly into account received a value of 1, those who take them into account 
quite a lot, 0.66, those who do not take them very much into account 0.33 and those who state that they do not take them into account 
at all, 0. 
The second step was to calculate the mean obtained in the four questions and transformed into a scale ranking from 0 to1 which, finally, 
is the indicator that measures attitudinal discipline in the study.  In the values close to 1 would be those terms of office when the 
representatives of the government party or parties have an attitude more favorable to discipline and in the values close to 0 those less 
favorable to receiving instructions from their party.    
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